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PERRY, MICHAEL J. Toward a Theory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, Courts. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. xii253 pp. $70.00 (cloth).
This book brings together two previously separate aspects of Michael J. Perry’s
thoughtful and pioneering scholarship dealing with the proper relation of mo-
rality (especially religious morality) to law and human rights and the role of
courts in protecting human rights. Perry’s argument concentrates on three
related issues: whether the morality of human rights has a religious or secular
ground or both, the relation between the morality of human rights and the
law of human rights, and the proper role of courts in protecting constitution-
ally embedded human rights in a liberal democracy. Before addressing these
issues, Perry distills the essence of the morality of human rights as holding
“that each and every born human being has inherent dignity and is inviolable”
(xi). He then begins developing a theory of human rights based on these core
moral principles, which he maintains have “become the dominant morality of
our time” (4), as demonstrated by their instantiation in many international
treaties and conventions.
With respect to the ground of human rights, Perry claims, “That there is a
religious ground for the morality of human rights—indeed, more than one—
is clear” (xi). By contrast, he maintains that a secular or nonreligious ground
has not been clearly established by John Finnis, Ronald Dworkin, Martha Nuss-
baum, or any other philosopher. Perry concludes that those rejecting a reli-
gious ground may have “no ground for the morality of human rights, no war-
rant for the claim that every human being has inherent dignity and is
inviolable” because “Nietzsche’s thought (‘not only no God, but no metaphys-
ical order of any kind’) and the morality of human rights . . . are deeply
antithetical to one another” (26, 29).
In light of the morality of human rights, Perry addresses the contemporary
legal issues of capital punishment, abortion, and same-sex unions. He con-
cludes that those accepting the morality of human rights should advocate abol-
ishing capital punishment, banning some abortions, and legally protecting
same-sex unions. Perry does not view these conclusions, however, as indications
of how the Supreme Court should rule. Rather, he argues that the courts
should defer to the legislative and executive determinations “unless there is
no room for a reasonable difference in judgments about how such a question
should be resolved” (109). Perry contends that this deference mitigates the
antimajoritarian difficulty arising from judicial ultimacy under the U.S. Con-
stitution by reinvigorating democratic deliberation, both by the populace and
by their elected representatives, so that seriously contested constitutional ques-
tions are informed by a community of political-moral judgment.
Perry stresses at several points that this book is only the beginning of a
complete theory of human rights and encourages further conversation. In this
spirit, scholars in religion will likely be interested in further treatment of sev-
eral aspects of his argument that touch on religion. First, if the morality of
human rights requires a religious ground, what role, if any, does the religious
ground play in specifying the content of indeterminate human rights norms
like equality and liberty? For example, Perry specifies a “general non-discrim-
ination ideal,” which prohibits the government from discriminating against a
human being “on the basis either of (a) a demeaning view about one or an-
other aspect of (what we many call) one’s ‘particularity’—about one’s race,
for example, or one’s sex, or (b) a negative generalization about one or an-
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other aspect of one’s particularity, if the government can, without serious cost,
avoid reliance on the generalization” (66). Based on this ideal, he concludes
that the government’s “refusal to extend the benefit of law to . . . same-sex
unions betrays the non-discrimination ideal to which we who affirm the mo-
rality of human rights should be committed” (76). Perry’s argument includes
a gap between the generality of the morality of human rights (i.e., “that each
and every born human being has inherent dignity and is inviolable” [11]) and
the quite specific “general” nondiscrimination ideal. Religion scholars, who
generally view religious convictions as including specifications of authentic hu-
man existence (including both traditional religions and so-called secular con-
ceptions), will likely suggest that religious convictions define what is demean-
ing and thus what counts as discriminatory. In other words, religion scholars
will likely wonder whether Perry’s identification of the religious ground for
the morality of human rights does not also identify the source or implicit
justification for getting from the generality of the morality of human rights to
the specificity of the law of human rights. If not, where does the content of
the indeterminate legal norms like equality and liberty come from?
For thinking about the relationship between law and religion, however, set-
tling this disagreement is not as important as recognizing the substantial role
for religion (whether implicit or explicit) in shaping the content of human
rights law. In other words, religion scholars will likely wonder whether Perry’s
identification of the religious ground for the morality of human rights does
not also identify the source or implicit justification for getting from the gen-
erality of the morality of human rights to the specificity of the law of human
rights. Thus, it would be helpful for Perry to clarify whether he understands
his argument to be identifying how specifications of equality (nondiscrimina-
tion) require content from religious conceptions of authentic human exis-
tence. If not, where does the content of the indeterminate legal norms like
equality and liberty come from?
In addition, Perry’s arguments for a religious ground for human rights res-
onate with an increasing focus on ontology in political and legal theory. In
political theory, Stephen K. White identifies a weak ontology in the work of
Judith Butler, William Connolly, George Kateb, and Charles Taylor that is im-
portant for Western notions of human rights (White, Sustaining Affirmation:
The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory [Princeton, NJ, 2000]). White
argues that their reflective political theories require fundamental conceptions
of the self, others, and the world but that these conceptions are partial, fallible,
and contestable. Similarly, Steven D. Smith argues that there is an “ontological
gap” between the classical or religious ontology presupposed by the practice
of law and the scientific ontology presupposed by contemporary legal theory.
The defective religious ontology still maintains “a sort of working partnership
between a divine author and human legislators,” which has been invalidated
by an unassailable scientific ontology (i.e., scientific materialism; Law’s Quan-
dary [Cambridge, MA, 2004], 155). Along with Perry’s religious ground for the
morality of human rights, the weak ontology in political theory and the on-
tological gap in legal theory suggest a possible religious or ontological turn in
human rights theory. Perry’s prior work makes him ideally suited for moving
the debate about the foundation of human rights more explicitly in this di-
rection.
MARK MODAK-TRURAN, Mississippi College.

